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The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous
Convictions Are Common in Capital Cases
SAMUEL R. GROSSt
I. DEATH Is DIFFERENT
As the Supreme Court has said, time and again, death is dif-
ferent: It is "different in kind from any other punishment imposed
under our system of criminal justice;"1 it "differs more from life
imprisonment than a 100-year sentence differs from one of only a
year or two;"' 2 and so forth. Traditionally, this observation has jus-
tified special procedural protections for capital defendants. Justice
Harlan put it nicely nearly forty years ago: "I do not concede that
whatever process is 'due' an offender faced with a fine or a prison
sentence necessarily satisfies the requirements of the Constitution
in a capital case." A central purpose of this special attention to
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1968, Columbia College; J.D. 1973,
University of California, Berkeley.
This article draws heavily on the published work of Hugo Bedau, Michael Radelet and
Constance Putnam. I acknowledge a debt to all three, and a special debt of gratitude to
Michael Radelet, who was as generous with time and advice as his many friends have come
to expect. I am also grateful for comments from Hugo Bedau, Phoebe Ellsworth, Andrea
Lyon, Daniel Polsby, Lauren Poper, James Rollin, Kent Syverud, Frank Zimring and the
participants at the March, 1996 symposium on the New York State death penalty at the
Law School of the State University of New York at Buffalo; for excellent research by Alex-
ander Sierck; and to Kristen Precht, for a wonderful combination of helpfulness, friendli-
ness, and humor.
1. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens,
JJ.).
2. Woodsaon v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 at 305 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell &
Stevens, JJ.).
3. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Beck v. Ala-
bama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980). More recently, the Supreme Court has decided several cases
in which the distinction cuts the other way; e.g. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983)
(special summary procedures appropriate in capital habeas corpus appeal because the state
cannot begin to execute the sentence until after completion of review). See also McCleskey
v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 347 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The Court today seems to
give a new meaning to our recognition that death is different. Rather than requiring 'a cor-
respondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination,' [citation
omitted] the Court relies on the very fact that this is a case involving capital punishment to
apply a lesser standard of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause."); Boyde v. Califor-
nia, 494 U.S. 370, 388 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I have long shared this Court's
assessment that death is qualitatively different from all other punishments [citations omit-
ted] but I have never understood this principle to mean that we should review death ver-
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capital cases is to prevent the conviction and execution of innocent
defendants. Until recently, most judges, lawyers and scholars were
willing to believe that the system worked as intended: that wrong-
ful capital convictions were rare, and wrongful executions virtually
non-existent.4 In the last decade, that optimistic view has become
increasingly implausible.
The major work that has challenged this comfortable ortho-
doxy is a study of wrongful convictions in "potentially capital
cases" by Professors Hugo Bedau and Michael Radelet. The first
published version of this work appeared in 1987;5 it listed 350 such
wrongful convictions,6 from 1900 through 1985, including 139
death sentences and 29 executions. In 1992 Professors Bedau and
Radelet, together with Ms. Constance Putnam, published their
findings in book form.8 By then the catalogue had been extended
to 416 miscarriages of justice, from 1900 through 1990. Some of the
cases on their list are controversial, including several of the execu-
tions: Bruno Hauptmann, Joe Hill, Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo
Vanzetti.9 For these cases, there are some writers who maintain
that the defendant was in fact guilty.10 But the precision of Bedau
and Radelet's judgment in every case hardly matters; it's the over-
all pattern that tells the story. In the great majority of their cases
dicts with less solicitude than other criminal judgments.").
4. For example, as late as 1978 Frank Carrington wrote: "our legal system examines
capital convictions with such an intense scrutiny that.., when there is the slightest doubt
of guilt (even after conviction), a commutation will usually result, or the individual will
otherwise be spared, thus lessening the chance of executing the innocent." FRANK CAR-
RINGTON, NEITHER CRUEL NOR UNUSUAL 123 (1978).
5. Hugo Bedau & Michael Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital
Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987) [hereinafter, Bedau & Radelet].
6. Bedau and Radelet define a "potentially capital case" as a prosecution for a crime
for which the death penalty was available in the jurisdiction (i.e., homicides and a small
number of rapes in several southern states), or for which the death penalty would have been
unavailable but for the abolition of capital punishment (which drew in 24 cases from aboli-
tionist states). Most of these cases did not result in death sentences, and in many the de-
fendants were convicted of non-capital homicides. Id. at 31.
7. Id. at 36.
8. MIcHAEL RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE (1992) [hereinafter RADELET, BEDAU
& PUTNAM].
9. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 5, at 74. The authors note without surprise that "we
have found no instance in which the government has officially acknowledged that an execu-
tion carried out under lawful authority was in error." Id. at 25. They do note a couple of
marginal exceptions-in the 1980's two American governors issued posthumous pardons (or
their equivalent) for prisoners executed in the 19th century, and in 1960 Queen Elizabeth of
Great Britain pardoned a man who had been hanged in 1950. Id. at 74-75 n.274.
10. See Stephen J. Markman and Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response
to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REv. 121 (1988).
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the error has been admitted or is beyond dispute.11 Even the dis-
puted cases suggest that there are severe doubts about the defend-
ants' guilt--which in turn means that many of them were innocent.
On the other side, Bedau and Radelet excluded cases in which the
defendants may well have been innocent, if, in their judgment, the
evidence of innocence was not sufficiently convincing. 12 In any
event, a compilation such as this can only be a list of illustrations
of the problem, not a catalogue of errors. As Bedau and Radelet
readily admit, nobody knows how many miscarriages of justice
have gone entirely undetected.1
The problem that Bedau and Radelet illustrate is central to
any debate on the use of the death penalty. The risk of executing
an innocent person poses a serious, perhaps unanswerable chal-
lenge to retributive justifications for capital punishment. Formal
arguments for this claim are somewhat elaborate,14 and some writ-
ers try to deny it,"5 but the essence of the position is easy: It's one
thing to satisfy our demand for retribution by killing a guilty mur-
derer-it's a debatable practice, but arguably just. It's quite an-
other to do so by killing an innocent defendant-or even one who
might be innocent, because if we do that often enough some of
those we kill will be innocent, even if we don't know which ones.
It's no surprise that executions of innocent defendants, or of de-
fendants who were widely believed to be innocent, have played ma-
jor parts in successful movements to abolish the death penalty,
from Michigan in 184616 to England in 1965.17 And in those juris-
dictions that have retained the death penalty, the danger of fatal
11. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 5, at 47.
12. Id. at 27.
13. Id.
14. Margaret J. Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process
for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1143 (1980); Richard 0. Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An
Assessment of the Moral Bases of the Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1177,
1225-31 (1981).
15. Ernest van den Haag, In Defense of the Death Penalty: A Practical and Moral
Analysis, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (Hugo Bedau ed. 3d 1982) 323, at 324-25.
Professor van den Haag eludes to the problem that executing innocents poses to retributive
justifications for capital punishment by shifting smoothly from an argument based on retri-
bution to one based on deterrence. Id. at 325. Deterrence might justify erroneous executions,
but the extensive body of evidence that has accumulated on the issue does not support the
claim that the death penalty deters homicides more than life imprisonment. See infra note
61.
16. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 5, at 76 (citing Bennett, The Reasons for Michigan's
Abolition of Capital Punishment, 62 MICH. HIST. 42, 49 n.24 (1978)); Louis H. Burbey, His-
tory of Execution in What Is Now the State of Michigan, 22 MICH. HIST. MAG. 443, 452
(1938); DETROrT NEWS, May 23, 1985 at 1, col. 2.
17. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 5, at 77 (citing N.Y. TMEs, Oct. 19, 1966, at 19, col.
3).
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errors is a major argument for extreme care in the investigation,
defense, trial and review of capital cases. 18
The essential thing to know about mistaken convictions in
capital cases is that they do happen and will continue to happen
with some regularity-as Bedau and Radelet have shown. Bedau
and Radelet do not try to estimate how often these tragic mistakes
occur, and neither will I, but I will address a related issue: Why do
they happen in death penalty cases? I will argue that it is no coin-
cidence-that the nature of capital cases multiplies the likelihood
of error.
It certainly looks as though miscarriages of justice are far
more likely to occur in capital cases than in other felony prosecu-
tions. By 1987 Bedau and Radelet had assembled information on
more erroneous convictions in capital cases in America in this cen-
tury than all other collections of such errors in all criminal cases,
combined."9 Since then, similar errors keep coming to light, includ-
ing a steady stream of defendants who have been exonerated and
released from death row. 0 In 1988, Arye Rattner published the
most comprehensive summary of information on known miscar-
riages of justice in America, regardless of crime or cause--205 erro-
neous convictions, from 1900 on.2" In 45% of Rattner's cases the
offense was murder, and in 12% the penalty was death. By com-
parison, homicides (of all sorts) make up a fraction of 1% of all
arrests in this country, and about 3% of arrests for crimes of vio-
lence.2 2 Murder and non-negligent homicide account for 1.4% of all
criminal convictions, about 8% of convictions for violent crimes,
less than 3% of all commitments to prison, and about 10% of com-
mitments to prison for crimes of violence.23 Death sentences ac-
count for about 2% of all murder convictions, less than two-tenths
of 1% of all convictions for violent crimes, and perhaps three-hun-
18. Susan Bandes, Simple Murder: A Comment on the Legality of Executing the Inno-
cent, 44 BUFF. L. REv. 501 (1996).
19. The most complete compilations of erroneous convictions, regardless of penalty, are
Samuel R. Gross, Loss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification and Proof of Guilt, 16 J.
LEGAL STUD. 395 (1987) (136 proven misidentifications, of which 97 resulted in convictions),
and Arye Rattner, Convicted but Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and the Criminal Justice
System, 12 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 203 (1988) (see infra note 21 and accompanying text).
20. See infra note 60 and accompanying text (the case of Randall Dale Adams), note
111 and accompanying text (the case of Walter McMillian), note 115 and accompanying text
(the case of Rolando Cruz, Alejandro Hernandez and Stephen Buckley); cf. infra note 119
and accompanying text (the case of Paris Carriger).
21. Rattner, supra note 19.
22. U.S. DFP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CaMUNAL
JUSTICE STATIsTcs-1994, at 384-85, Tables 4.7, 4.8 [hereinafter SOURCEnooK 1994].
23. Id. at 485, Table 5.46, 553, Table 6.32.
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dredths of 1% of all criminal convictions.24 In other words, capital
cases are heavily over-represented among known miscarriages of
justice-5 to 1 or 10 to 1 or 100 to 1 or more, depending on which
comparison seems most telling.
There is an obvious competing explanation for this striking
disproportion. We pay more attention to homicides than to other
crimes, more to first degree murders than to other homicides, and
more to capital cases than to other first degree murders. Therefore,
we would be likely to detect more errors among homicide convic-
tions than among other felonies-and especially among the most
aggravated homicides-even if the errors that occur were evenly
distributed. Indeed, since we are so much more careful in trying
and reviewing cases, we not only detect and correct more errors, we
also prevent many errors from occurring in the first place. The net
effect (the argument goes) is that capital cases are less error-prone
than other prosecutions, appearances to' the contrary
notwithstanding.
In part, this argument is certainly true. With more effort we
could discover more miscarriages of justice, and we do devote more
attention to capital cases than to other felony prosecutions. But as
a complete explanation for the apparent abundance of errors in
capital cases, this hypothesis strikes me as implausible.25 For one
thing, many of the known miscarriages of justice-capital and non-
capital alike-were discovered by sheer chance.26 If chance were
the only factor, the known cases would be representative of the
entire set; since it's only one causal factor, the sample is no doubt
quite different from the universe. Still, if even a third of the errors
surfaced by luck alone, it would be surprising if murders were over
represented in the set of all known errors by a factor of five or ten
or a hundred.
For the moment, I will address the other side of this problem:
the special factors that produce errors in capital cases. At the end
of part Ill and in the Conclusion, I will return to the possible off-
setting effects of added care at trial and on review, which may help
us to catch mistakes after they've been made.
24. Id. at 486, Table 5.48, 590-91, Tables 6.74, 6.76.
25. It is also an extremely pessimistic hypothesis, because it implies that there are
thousands and thousands of undiscovered cases of defendants who were wrongly convicted
of robbery, burglary, assault, and other crimes, and who could have been exonerated if we
had investigated their crimes with as much care as we devote to murders.
26. EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT, ERRORS OF CRIMNAL JUSTICE
(1932) at xix; Bedau & Radelet, supra note 5, at 70; Gross, supra note 19, at 422.
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II. DEFINING THE ISSUES
The archetypal capital case is a highly publicized prosecution
for a brutal and gory murder, in which the defendant is tried, con-
victed, sentenced to death, and eventually executed. Needless to
say, most capital cases differ from this standard in one or several
respects. The case may receive relatively little publicity; the mur-
der may be relatively low on the scale of horror; the defendant may
plead guilty rather than go to trial, in which case he will normally
be sentenced to life imprisonment or a term of years; if he does go
to trial he may be convicted of a non-capital crime, or acquitted
altogether; 27 if he is convicted of a capital crime, he may be sen-
tenced to life imprisonment; and finally, if he is sentenced to
death, he will probably never be executed.28 I am concerned with
any wrongful conviction of a defendant charged with a capital
crime, regardless of the crime or the penalty. The worst mistake,
the execution of an innocent defendant, appears to be the rarest.
This is what we ought to expect: guilty or innocent, few of those
who are sentenced to death in America are actually executed.29
Among the known cases of wrongful conviction, many more inno-
cent defendants were either convicted of first-degree murder and
sentenced to death but not executed, or convicted of first degree
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment; much smaller groups
were convicted of second degree murder, or even manslaughter or
lesser felonies, and sentenced to terms of years.30
A conviction can be "wrong" in many ways. It might be exces-
sive-for example, if the defendant is really guilty of second degree
murder but was convicted of first-degree murder; or the jury might
have been right to conclude that the defendant committed the fa-
tal act, but wrong to reject a defense of insanity or self-defense; or
a conviction that is factually accurate might have been obtained in
violation of the defendant's constitutional rights. I'm not con-
cerned with any of these types of errors.31 Like Bedau and
27. Throughout this paper I refer to homicide defendants using masculine pronouns.
This is a conscious editorial choice rather than an archaic and sexist convention. It reflects
the fact that 91% of homicide defendants, 98.7% of death row prisoners, and 99.7% of
prisoners executed in this country since 1967, are men. Sourcebook 1994, supra note 22 at
342, Table 3.121; NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Death Row U.S.A., Winter
1995, [hereinafter Death Row U.S.A.].
28. Samuel R. Gross, The Romance of Revenge: Capital Punishment in America, 13
STUD. IN L. POL. & Soc'y 71, 77 (1993).
29. From January 1, 1973, to January 31, 1996, there were 5,114 death sentences and
318 executions in the United States. Death Row U.S.A., supra note 27.
30. Bedau and Radelet, supra note 5, at 36.
31. Not that these other errors are unimportant. As Professor Charles Black has
pointed out, they too are a predictable consequence of our system of administering capital
[Vol. 44
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Radelet,3 2 I shall limit my focus to convictions of "the wrong per-
son"; a defendant who did not do the act that caused the death or
deaths for which he was convicted.
Erroneous convictions (as I have defined them) may occur dis-
proportionately often in capital cases for two types of reasons: (1)
Because of factors that are common or inevitable in capital prose-
cutions, but that occur in other cases as well-for instance, the fact
that the crime involves homicide, or that it was heavily publicized;
(2) Because of consequences that flow from the demand for the
death penalty itself. Some factors may appear in both groups. For
example, a capital case is likely to be the sort of case that would be
highly publicized in any event, and asking for the death penalty is
likely to make it more so.
If capital cases do produce erroneous convictions, there are
different implications depending on the cause for the erroneous
conviction. The causes in the first group imply that we should be
wary of imposing or executing death sentences, because capital
cases are of the sort where erroneous convictions are particularly
likely regardless of the sanction requested or imposed. Abolishing
the death penalty would not reduce the number of erroneous con-
victions of that type, but rather would eliminate the worst conse-
quence of those errors. The causes in the second group imply that
the death penalty itself undermines the accuracy of our system of
adjudication, that it "tends to distort the course of the criminal
law."' As Justice Frankfurter put it: "When life is at hazard in a
trial, it sensationalizes the whole thing almost unwittingly. The ef-
fect ... [is] very bad."' 4 If that's true, abolishing capital punish-
ment would reduce the number of erroneous convictions of all sorts
in those cases in which we now seek the death penalty, and not
merely limit the harm of those errors that do occur.
III. THE PRODUCTION OF ERRORS
A. Investigation
1. Clearance Rates and Pressure on the Police. We often
talk of a miscarriage of justice as an error at trial, but that's a
mistake. The error occurs much earlier, in the investigation of the
crime, when the police identify the wrong person as the criminal. If
punishment. CHARLEs BLACK, JR., CAPrrAL PuNIsHMNT. THE INEvrrAurry OF CAPmCE AD
MISTAKE, 22-30 (2d ed., 1981).
32. Bedau and Radelet, supra note 5, at 42.
33. Herbert B. Ehrmann, The Death Penalty and the Administration of Justice, 284
ANNALs OF Am. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 73, 83 (1952).
34. FRmx FR KuRTER, OF LAW AND MEN 81 (1956).
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they gather enough evidence against this innocent suspect, the er-
ror will ripen into a criminal charge; if that charge survives the
formal and informal processes of pre-trial screening, it will. go to
trial and a jury may confirm the mistake by a wrongful conviction.
For the police, the issue is: What factors make mistakes more
likely? For the prosecutor, the judge, and the jury the issue is:
What factors reduce the likelihood that they will correct police
errors?
Most crimes are never solved. In 1993, a mere 21% of all seri-
ous crimes known to the police were "cleared"-which usually
means that a suspect was arrested; of serious violent crimes, 44%
were cleared. 5 But even these low figures only tell half the story.
Most crimes are not "known to the police"r-in 1993, only 35% of
all crimes, and 42% of crimes of violence, were reported. 6 In other
words, only about 18% of all crimes of violence are solved by the
police, including about 13% of robberies, 18% of rapes, and 6% of
burglaries.
On the whole, the crimes that are reported to the police have
better evidence than those that are not reported. Cases with ex-
tremely strong evidence-those in which the culprit is caught in
the act, or seen and identified by several people-are almost al-
ways reported. If the victim has to take the initiative to notify the
police, he'll be more likely to do so if he thinks there's a good
chance that the criminal will be caught. If the police do hear about
a robbery, or a rape, or a burglary, for which the identity of the
criminal is not immediately obvious, their investigation will usually
be perfunctory: put out a call to other officers to try to spot the
criminal in flight; interview the witnesses at the scene; collect im-
mediately available physical evidence; that's it. If a suspect doesn't
emerge from this process it is unlikely that the case will ever be
prosecuted. Police detectives do not have the time to conduct de-
tailed investigations of every reported felony, and in the usual run-
of-the-mill case there is little pressure on them to do so. The net
result is that in general the felonies that are prosecuted are likely
to be those in which the evidence of guilt is strongest.
Homicides are different. First, almost every homicide is re-
35. Sourcebook 1994, supra note 22, at 406, Table 4.23. The "serious crimes" included
in this figure are those on the Federal Bureau of Investigation's uniform crime reporting
"index": murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault,
burglary, larceny and motor vehicle theft. Of these, all but burglary, larceny and motor
vehicle theft are "serious violent crimes." Arson is also an "index" crime, but it's not in-
cluded in this tabulation because the data are insufficiently complete.
36. Id. at 245, Table 3.32.
37. Id. at 245, Table 3.32, 406, Table 4.23.
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ported to the police when the body of the deceased person is
found. There are exceptions-cases in which the body is not dis-
covered, and others in which the cause of death is mistaken for
accident or suicide or natural causes-but they could not account
for more than a few percent of the total.3 8 Second, most homicides
known to the police are cleared-66% in 1993, s1 more in previous
years.40 Overall, the proportion of all homicides that are solved is
about four times higher than the comparable proportion for other
violent crimes.41 A study of robbery investigations in Chicago in
1982-83, by Franklin Zinring and James Zuehl, provides an excel-
lent illustration: 13% of all robberies reported to the police were
solved within two months (including a somewhat lower proportion
of robberies with injuries to the victims), compared to 57% of rob-
bery killings.42 This difference cannot be explained by superior ev-
idence-on the contrary, robbery homicides will usually have
weaker evidence, since the victim is dead-but must be due to a
systematic difference in the investigation by the police.
Many homicides, perhaps most, are easy to investigate. Most
homicides are committed by relatives, friends or acquaintances of
the victim, and many if not most occur during arguments or
brawls.43 In a typical ordinary homicide-a killing by a friend as a
result of a drunken fight-the killer is known from the start. But
the police get the hard murders as well as the easy ones, and there
is much more pressure to solve these cases than non-homicidal
crimes. The relatives of the victim care more, the prosecutor cares
38. See Samuel R. Gross and Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial
Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REv. 27, at 51
n.98 (comparing homicides reported to the police to vital statistics data on mortality from
homicide, which are taken from death certificates).
39. Sourcebook 1994, supra note 22, at 406, Table 4.23.
40. E.g., FEDERAE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CREME REPORTS 1952, at 43
(clearance rate for murder and non-negligent homicide in 1952 was 94.9%); FEDMIAL BU-
REAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1961, at 14 Chart 8 (clearance rate for
murder and non-negligent homicide in 1961 was 93.1%).
41. For some crimes-conspicuously, robbery and burglary-the police clearance rate
(such as it is) is inflated by a common pattern of criminal behavior. Often a robber or a
burglar will commit a series of similar crimes-several holdups of Seven-Elevens, on week-
end evenings, using the same snub-nosed .38; a series of daytime burglaries in a particular
neighborhood, stealing only stereo equipment; whatever. If the criminal is eventually caught
in the act, or by chance, the police-who have done little all along but keep tabs on the
progression-may be able to clear 3 or 5 or 10 felonies all at once. Homicides rarely provide
this opportunity. Serial murders are thankfully rare, and when they do occur the police are
in no position to sit back and hope that the criminal will eventually fall into their hands in
the course of some future killing.
42. Franklin E. Zimring and James Zuehl, Victim Injury and Death in Urban Robbery:
A Chicago Study, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 26-28 (1986).
43. SouncEaooK 1994, supra note 22, at 334, Table 3.111, 341, Table 3.119.
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more, the public is much more likely to be concerned, and the po-
lice themselves care more. Death produces strong reactions-in
this context, a desire to punish and to protect. Other outrageous
crimes can have the same effect-kidnappings, for example, or se-
rial rapes-but they are rare. Homicide is common.
For the most part, the pressure to solve homicides produces
the intended results. The police spend more time, they are more
persistent, they have more resources at their disposal, and they
catch more of the criminals. An investigation that would be closed
without arrest if it were a mere robbery, may end in a conviction if
the robber killed one of his victims. But that same pressure can
also produce mistakes. If the murder cannot be readily solved, the
police may be tempted to cut corners, to jump to conclusions,
and-if they believe they have the killer-perhaps to manufacture
evidence to clinch the case. The danger that the investigators will
go too far is magnified to the extent that the killing is brutal and
horrifying, and to the extent that it attracts public atten-
tion-factors which also increase the likelihood that the murder
will be treated as a capital case.
The murder of 10-year-old Jeanine Nicarico is a good exam-
ple." In February 1983 she was abducted from her home in Naper-
ville, Illinois, raped and killed-a crime of stunning brutality. The
murder was the subject of a long, frustrating, unsuccessful investi-
gation-a humiliating public failure. Thirteen months after the
murder-and less than two weeks before the local prosecutor stood
for reelection-three men were indicted: Rolando Cruz, Alejandro
Hernandez and Stephen Buckley. Cruz and Hernandez were con-
victed and sentenced to death; their convictions were reversed by
the Illinois Supreme Court. They were convicted again, but this
time only Cruz was sentenced to death. Again the convictions were
reversed. Finally, at Cruz's third trial-over twelve years after the
murder-the case fell apart when a police officer admitted he had
lied under oath, and the judge entered a judgment of acquittal.
What seems to have happened is this: under intense pressure, the
police convinced themselves that they knew who killed Jeanine Ni-
carico, and they manufactured evidence to convince prosecutors
and to use in court. If the criminal had taken jewelry from the
Nicarico home rather than a child-or even if he had knocked out
a family member or set the home on fire-there would probably
have been a minimal investigation, no arrests, no trial, and no erro-
neous convictions.
44. Maurice Possley, The Nicarico Nightmare, Admitted Lie Sinks Cruz Case, CH.
Tam., Nov. 5, 1995, at A12. All the information on the Nicarico case in the following para-
graph comes from Mr. Possley's article.
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In some highly charged murders, the police manufacture a
case out of whole cloth. When Ronda Morrison was murdered on
November 1, 1986, in Monroeville, Alabama, there were no sus-
pects, and an eight-month investigation turned up no leads. 45 Then
the police arrested a man by the name of Ralph Myers in connec-
tion with a different killing in a nearby county, and pressured him
into saying that he drove Walter McMillian-a local resident-to
the scene of the crime, and saw him shoot Ms. Morrison. Myers
initially denied that he knew McMillian, or anything whatever
about the killing, but eventually he gave in and said what he was
told to say. McMillian was convicted and sentenced to death; he
spent six years on death row before the frame-up was exposed. It's
easy to see the hand of racism in this case. Apparently McMillian
was chosen for the role of killer because he was a black man in
rural Alabama who was known to have carried on an extra-marital
affair with a white woman. But the nature of the crime was also an
essential ingredient. Even the most racist police would hardly go to
all that trouble for anything less than a heinous crime, and they'd
be most likely to do it for capital murder."
2. Eyewitness Identification. Most miscarriages of justice for
crimes other than homicide are caused by eyewitness misidentifica-
tions. In Rattner's sample of wrongful convictions, 52% of the er-
rors for which the cause could be determined were caused by mis-
identifications,47 and other researchers concur that eyewitness
error is by far the most common cause of convictions of innocent
defendants.48 On the other hand, eyewitness error was a factor in
45. Peter Applebome, Alabama Releases Man Held on Death Row for Six Years, N.Y.
Ths, Mar. 3, 1993, at Al.
46. There is an important historical exception to this pattern. Before Coker v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 584 (1977), the death penalty was available as a punishment for rape in several
southern states. In practice, the death penalty for rape was used almost exclusively to pun-
ish black men who had been convicted of raping white women. MARVIN E. WOLFANG AND
MARC RmIEL, "RAPE, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND THE DEATH PENALTY," in HUGo A. BEDAU
AND CHESTER M. PIERCE, ED.'S, CAPrrAL PUNISHmENT IN THE UNITED STATES 99-121 (1976).
One aspect of this discrimination was that some black men were falsely accused of rape by
white women, and sentenced to death, when in fact no crime had occurred at all because
there had been no sexual contact whatever, see Bedau & Radelet, supra note 5, at 148 (the
"Scottsboro Boys" case), or because sexual relations had been consensual, see id. at 127 (the
case of Jess Hollins).
47. Rattner, supra note 19, at 291.
48. E.g., REPORT OF CommrrTEE OF INQUIRY INTO CASE oF ADOLPH BECK 62 Parl. Papers
Sec. 2315 (1905); FELix FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANzETrI 30 (1927);
BORCHARD, supra note 26, at xiii (1932); JUDI IAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
FouRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1948),
at 229-68; PATRICK M. WALL, EYEWrrNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES (1965); Wade v.
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only 16% of Bedau and Radelet's cases of errors in potentially cap-
ital prosecutions.49 This disparity may not prove that there is a
systematic difference in the causes of errors between capital and
other non-capital cases-as Bedau and Radelet point out, the sam-
ples are too unsystematic for firm conclusions 5 -but it certainly
does suggest it. If we assume that among the murder cases in
Rattner's sample-which make up 42% of the total-eyewitness
misidentifications caused 17% of the errors (a slightly higher pro-
portion than Bedau and Radelet report), that implies that over
80% of the errors in non-murder cases were due to
misidentifications.51
No doubt the main reason for this difference is the absence of
a live victim in most homicides.2 Victims provide crucial identifi-
cation evidence in most robberies and rapes, and so they make
most of the mistakes, when mistakes are made. In the absence of a
victim the police may have no eyewitness evidence, and therefore
no room for eyewitness error. This is hardly an advantage for accu-
racy. Many, perhaps most eyewitness identifications of criminals
by strangers are accurate.5 - Frequently they are corroborated or
lead to other evidence that greatly reduces the likelihood of er-
ror-fingerprints, stolen property, reliable confessions, etc.54 In ad-
dition, for about half of all violent crimes eyewitness identifica-
tions are extremely reliable because the crimes were committed by
relatives, friends, or others who are known to the victims.5 5 Mur-
derers are even more likely to be known to their victims 5 but that
may not always help because in the words of the immortal cliche,
United States, 388 U.S. 219, 229 (1967) (quoting WALL, supra note 46); Patrick Devlin et al.,
Report to the Secretary of State for the Home Department of the Departmental Committee
on Evidence of Identification in Criminal cases (1976); C. Ronald Huff et al., Guilty Until
Proven Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and Public Policy, 39 CRIME & DaINQ. 518, 624
(1986).
49. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 5, at 57, 61 n.184.
50. Id.
51. Unfortunately, Rattner does not report the cause of error by category of crime. We
could arrive at about the same estimate from a different direction: by assuming that the
proportion of murders among all misidentifications (which Rattner also does not report) is
the same as the ratio I found in my study of misidentification, 18% (24/135). Gross, supra
note 19, at 413. Using those figures, the estimates are: 21% of errors in murder cases are
caused by misidentifications, and 78% of errors in non-murder cases.
52. BORcHARD, supra note 26, at 70; Bedau & Radelet, supra note 5, at 61 n.184.
53. See Richard Gonzalez et al., Response Biases in Lineups and Showups, 64 J.
PERSP. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 27 (1993) (contrary to popular impression, one-on-one on the scene
"showup" identifications may lead to few erroneous identifications).
54. See Gross, supra note 19, at 432-40.
55. SOURCns0o 1994, supra note 22, at 235-36, Tables 3.11, 3.12.
56. Id. at 341, Table 3.119.
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"dead men don't talk." The absence of eyewitness evidence in
many homicides drives the police to rely on evidence from other
sources: accomplices; jail-house snitches and other underworld
figures; and confessions from the defendants themselves. Not sur-
prisingly, perjury by a prosecution witness is the leading cause of
error in erroneous capital convictions, and false confessions are the
third most common cause.
57
So far I've compared homicides to other crimes of vio-
lence-crimes to which there are usually eyewitnesses. Other
crimes, however, typically have no eyewitnesses-burglary, for ex-
ample. Erroneous convictions may well occur in burglary cases, but
if so they are rarely discovered and reported. Only one of a sample
of 136 proven misidentifications was a burglary,58 and Rattner does
not even list the crime as a category for his sample of erroneous
convictions. Eyewitness evidence may play a role in solving an oc-
casional burglary-a homeowner may catch a glimpse of the fleeing
criminal, and later identify his picture-and once in a while (in the
absence of determinative physical evidence) this may lead to er-
rors. The same thing may happen in those homicides in which the
killer is not immediately known; indeed it is more likely, since kill-
ing is more often a crime of passion rather than of calculation.
These are chance events, unforced errors. If the burglar is not eas-
ily identified, that's usually the end: hence a clearance rate for bur-
glary of only 13% of crimes known to the police.59 In homicide in-
vestigations the police work to solve the hard cases as well, and
they often succeed. But in the process they force more errors-of
the same sort, and other types-as they press on against increasing
odds.
3. Perjury by the Real Killers, and by Others. The killer who
blames his crime on others is a familiar character in fiction. The
most famous, no doubt, is Macbeth, who planted bloody daggers
on Duncan's grooms, and then killed them himself in a supposed
fit of vengeful rage. The model for modern type of deceitful killer,
however, is Mark Twain's Injun Joe, from The Adventures of Tom
Sawyer, who murdered young Dr. Robinson and then pinned the
killing on hapless drunk Muff Potter.60 Similar things happen in
real life. Some criminals implicate innocent defendants in order to
divert suspicion from themselves. In other cases, false witnesses
57. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 5, at 57.
58. Gross, supra note 19, at 413.
59. SOURCEOOK 1994, supra note 22, at 406, Table 4.23.
60. SAMUEL CLEMENS, THE ADVENTURES OF TOM SAWYER (John C. Gerber et al. eds.,
Univ. of Col. Press 1982) (1876).
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who may have had no role in the crime lie for money or for other
favors from the authorities. Both of these motives are more power-
ful in homicides than in other criminal cases, and especially in cap-
ital homicides.
First, the threat of being caught is much greater for a homi-
cide than for almost any other crime. It's no news that the police
work much harder to find killers than burglars or robbers, and that
their interest increases in proportion to the brutality and notoriety
of the crime.
Second, if the culprit is suspected and caught, he has more to
fear in a capital case: he might get executed. The threat of death
can be a powerful motivator, when it's concrete. The death penalty
as an abstract prospect does not seem to deter many homicides.6 1
Before the crime, the killer-if he thinks about it at all-no doubt
expects to escape scot free; he's not likely to weigh the benefits of
murder against the costs of the possible punishment. After the
crime, however, there is more time to think, and the fear of convic-
tion and execution may be vivid-especially if the police seem to
be closing in.
Third, a perjurious killer may have to admit to crimes himself.
He and the innocent defendant may in fact have been accomplices
in some crime other than the murder, or he might have been
caught in undeniably compromising circumstances, or he might
have to admit to some level of guilt in order to make his accusation
credible. If so, the real killer has more to gain in a capital case
than under other circumstances. If he has to go to prison, the gain
from cooperation is time vs. death, as opposed to less time vs. more
time. But that may not be necessary: if he helps break a capital
case, he may walk. For example, in December 1976 David Harris
was arrested in Vidor, Texas, in connection with the murder of
Dallas patrolman Robert Wood, and promptly blamed the killing
on Randall Dale Adams, a passing acquaintance with whom he had
spent most of the day leading up to the murder. 2 Harris admitted
that he stole the car from which the patrolman was shot, was pre-
sent at the murder, and kept the stolen car afterwards.6 ' He was
certainly liable for auto theft, and possibly as an accessory to mur-
der. Instead, after Adams was convicted, all charges against Harris
61. For useful summaries of the literature on the deterrent effects of the death penalty,
see Lempert, supra note 14, at 1187-1224; ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY, A WORLD-
WIDE PERSPECTIvE 117-48 (1989); FRANK E. ZIMRING AND GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISH-
mENT AND THE AMERIcAN AGENDA 167-86 (1986).
62. J. Michael Kennedy and Daniel Cerone, Conviction Set Aside for Thin Blue Line
Character, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 2, 1989, at Al.
63. Id.
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were dropped."4
Fourth, if the witness is lying to get favors unrelated to the
crime at issue, he'll do much better if it's a big case-which usually
means a murder, or better yet, a capital murder. The typical wit-
ness in this category is the jail-house snitch. For example, in 1932
Gus Colin Langley was convicted of first degree murder in North
Carolina based in part on testimony from his cellmate, who said
that Langley had confessed to him.6 5 Langley came within half an
hour of electrocution, but was exonerated four years later and re-
ceived a full pardon. His cellmate didn't have to wait that long;
after his perjurious testimony, unrelated charges against him were
dropped.66
Fifth, it's easier to lie about a capital case than most other
crimes of violence: there's usually no live victim to contradict the
false witness.
The overall result seems to be that witness perjury is a far
more common cause of error in murders and other capital cases
than in lesser crimes. Bedau and Radelet identified it as a factor in
35% of their erroneous capital convictions, 7 while Rattner lists
perjury as the cause of only 11% of his errors. 8 But recall that
45% of Rattner's cases are murders. If perjury was as common
among the murder convictions in Rattner's sample as among
Bedau and Radelet's cases, then erroneous murder convictions
could easily account for all the cases in which the error was caused
by perjury.
The case of Paris Carriger is a good illustration of the role of
perjury in capital prosecutions.69 On March 14, 1978, Carriger was
arrested for the brutal robbery murder of Robert Shaw, the owner
of a jewelry store, on the previous day. The evidence against Car-
riger was provided by Robert Dunbar, a friend on whose property
Carriger was living in a trailer. Dunbar-who had a great deal of
experience as a police informant-called the police and said he
64. Id.
65. Radelet & Bedau, supra note 5, at 137-38.
66. Id. This is hardly the only case in which perjury by a jail-house snitch contributed
to a capital conviction. See also id. at 101 (the case of J.B. Brown, Florida, 1901), at 142
(the case of Margaret and Jesse Lucas, Illinois, 1909), at 158 (the case of Albert Sonders,
Alabama, 1917), at 121 (the case of Gerald Growder, Michigan, 1931), at 114 (the case of
James Foster, Georgia, 1956), at 110 (the case of George De Los Santos, New Jersey, 1975),
at 113 (the case of Neil Ferber, Pennsylvania, 1982).
67. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 5, at 57.
68. Rattner, supra note 19, at 291.
69. Beth Hawkins and Kristin Solheim, The Wrong Man, TucsoN WEEKLY, Dec. 8-14,
1993, at 1. All information in the following paragraph about the Carriger case comes from
the article by Ms. Hawkins and Ms. Solheim.
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could identify Shaw's killer in return for immunity from prosecu-
tion for various felonies: another robbery he committed two days
earlier, possession of a gun he had bought (which was illegal be-
cause he was a convicted felon), and attempting to dispose of the
proceeds of the Shaw robbery-murder. The police agreed to these
terms. Dunbar then told them that Carriger had come to him, con-
fessed to the killing, and asked for help in disposing of bloody
clothes and stolen jewelry; Dunbar corroborated the story by pro-
ducing some of the loot, and leading the police to some of the
clothes. Carriger was convicted and sentenced to death almost en-
tirely on Dunbar's testimony. He steadfastly maintained his inno-
cence, and claimed that Dunbar himself-a man with a long his-
tory of violence and deception-must have committed the murder.
After the trial, Dunbar, who was soon jailed for other crimes,
bragged that he had framed Carriger. In 1987 he confessed his own
guilt to various people, including his parents and a clergyman.
That same year he repeated his confession in court, and admitted
that he had lied at Carriger's trial and that he had committed the
murder himself; three weeks later he retracted that confession, but
admitted that he was doing so for fear that he'd be prosecuted for
the murder and executed himself. In 1991, shortly before he died
in prison, Dunbar confessed again, to his cellmate. Dunbar's ex-
wife, who had corroborated his original story and had given him an
alibi, testified in 1987 that Dunbar had forced her to lie.
Despite these developments, Carriger remains on death row.
He has come close to execution on several occasions while his at-
torneys have fought for a new trial.70 Under the circumstances, this
seems a modest goal, since, at a minimum, the new evidence that
has turned up since the trial raises grave doubts about Carriger's
guilt. But if Robert Shaw hadn't been killed, none of this would
ever have happened in the first place. Dunbar would probably
never have approached the police, they would hardly have given an
ex-felon immunity from prosecution for three serious felonies in
order to convict someone else of a single robbery, and the victim
would have been available to contradict a false story.
4. Confessions. A typical robbery investigation is resolved by
an eyewitness identification; a typical homicide investigation is re-
solved by a confession. Many confessions are straight-forward af-
fairs-volunteered by suspects who are overcome by guilt, or be-
lieve they have nothing to lose. These are the easy cases, where
70. Bob Egelko, U.S. Appeals Court Stays Arizona Execution, THE ARIZONA DAILY
STAR, Dec. 2, 1995, at 1.
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nothing has been done that might produce a false confession, and
where more often than not there is strong corroborating evidence
of guilt. Some confessions, however, are not so readily given, but
are instead the end products of long, drawn out interrogations.
American police officers use all sorts of coercive and manipula-
tive methods to obtain confessions. They confuse and disorient the
suspect; they lie about physical evidence, about witnesses, about
statements by other suspects; they pretend that they already have
their case sealed and are only giving the suspect a chance to ex-
plain his side of the story; they pretend to understand, to sympa-
thize, to excuse; they play on the suspect's fears, his biases, his
loyalty to family and friends, his religion; they exhaust the suspect
and wear him down; in some cases, they use violence, even tor-
ture.71 These are powerful techniques. They work to get confes-
sions from guilty defendants-and sometimes from innocent de-
fendants as well.
From the point of view of the police, the main problem with
interrogation is not that it occasionally produces errors, but that
it's extremely time consuming. It's likely to take hours, perhaps
days to break down a suspect who resists and insists on his inno-
cence. Frequently several police officers cooperate in the effort,
questioning the suspect simultaneously or in relays. As a result,
extended interrogation is largely reserved for big cases in which
confessions are necessary for successful prosecution. Typically,
that means homicides, and especially the most heinous homicides,
for reasons I've mentioned: these are the cases that the police are
most anxious to solve, and yet, because the victim is dead, they
frequently lack eyewitnesses. 2
As with perjury, false confessions are a much more common
cause of errors for homicides than for other crimes. They were a
cause of 14% of Bedau and Radelet's errors in homicide and capi-
71. See YALE KAmSAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 1-40 (1980) for a classic
description of the coercive aspects of interrogation.
72. There is a separate reason why the police might conduct extensive interrogations in
homicide cases even if the identity of the killer is not in doubt. For most crimes-e.g., rob-
bery-once you know who did it, the outcome is determined: guilt. Criminal homicide, how-
ever, is a finely graded offense, from capital murder at the top to involuntary manslaughter
at the bottom, and it is often subject to arguments of self defense (a justification) or provo-
cation (a partial excuse). If the state wants to convict the suspect of first degree or capital
murder, it may need evidence on the circumstances leading up to the killing, and on the
killer's state of mind. Skillful interrogators can often get that sort of evidence out of the
mouths of the suspects themselves. Interrogations for the purpose of establishing the level
of a criminal homicide, or to negate self defense, are beyond the scope of this article, since I
am concerned only with convictions of defendants who did not kill at all.
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tal cases, 3 but only 8% of the errors reported by Rattner. 4 Since
45% of Rattner's cases are homicides, this suggests that false con-
fessions are three to four times more common as a cause of miscar-
riages of justice for homicide cases than for other crimes.75
The case of Melvin Reynolds is a good example, 6 but by no
means unique.7 7 On May 26, 1978, 4-year-old Eric Christgen disap-
peared in downtown St. Joseph, Missouri. His body later turned up
along the Missouri river; he had been sexually abused and died of
suffocation. The police questioned over a hundred possible sus-
pects, including "every known pervert in town," to no avail. One of
them was Melvin Reynolds, a 25-year-old man of limited intelli-
gence who had been sexually abused himself as a child and who
had some homosexual episodes as an adolescent. Reynolds, al-
though extremely agitated by the investigation, cooperated
through several interrogations over a period of months, including
two polygraph examinations and one interrogation under hypnosis.
In December 1978 he was questioned under sodium amytal ("truth
serum") and made an ambiguous remark that intensified police
suspicion. Two months later, in February 1979, the police brought
the still cooperative Reynolds in for another round of interroga-
tion-fourteen hours of questions, promises and threats. Finally,
Reynolds gave in and said, "I'll say so if you want me to." In the
weeks that followed, Reynolds embellished this concession with de-
tails that were fed to him, deliberately or otherwise. That was
enough to convince the prosecutor to charge Reynolds, and to con-
vince a jury to convict him of second degree murder. He was sen-
tenced to life imprisonment. Four years later, Reynolds was re-
leased when another man-Charles Hatcher-confessed to three
murders, including that of Eric Christgen. As the St. Louis Post-
Dispatch put it in an editorial: "The Reynolds case says something
about confessions and police methods used to extract them, even
when these methods fall short of outright physical brutality. Under
the stress of constant harassment, individuals can reach breaking
73. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 5, at 58.
74. Rattner, supra note 19, at 291.
75. Note that comparing one set of proven miscarriages of justice to another probably
understates the difference between homicides and capital cases on the one hand, and other
criminal prosecutions on the other, since those lesser cases that result in errors will include
a disproportionate number of cases that are similar to homicides in that the crimes are
horrifying or receive extensive publicity, and as a result are the subject of exhaustive
investigations.
76. RADELEr, BEDAU & PuTNAM, supra note 8, at 10-15; Bedau & Radelet, supra note 5,
at 155. All the information about the Reynolds case in this paragraph is based on these two
sources.
77. See Richard Jerome, Suspect Confessions, N.Y. TnmEs, Aug. 13, 1995, Sec. 6, at 28.
[Vol. 44
THE RISKS OF DEATH
points."
B. Plea Bargaining and Dismissal
Most prosecutions are resolved without trial. Eighty to 90% of
convictions result from guilty pleas, 7  usually after plea bargains,
and at least 80% of defendants who are not convicted obtain pre-
trial dismissals rather than acquittals. 79 In other words, most of
the work of sorting criminal cases after arrest is done pre-trial, by
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to dismiss, to reduce
charges, or to recommend or agree to a particular sentence. The
direct impact of this pre-trial process is much more important to
the accuracy of criminal dispositions than anything that happens
later on. And yet, in the most important cases-murders, and espe-
cially capital murders-pre-trial screening may be distorted in
ways that produce two distinct types of error.
1. Guilty Pleas by Innocent Defendants. Threat is an essen-
tial part of all plea bargaining: take the deal or you'll do worse
after conviction. There is, undeniably, a coercive aspect to this bar-
gain-the defendant must risk a severe penalty in order to exercise
his right to trial-and plea bargaining has been strongly criticized
on that ground. 0 Nonetheless the Supreme Court has held that
coercion of that sort does not violate the due process clause."' One
of the few qualifications on this general rule is a restriction on the
form of death penalty statutes. While it is permissible for a prose-
cutor to ask for death and then let the defendant plead guilty in
return for a lesser penalty-even if the defendant continues to
deny that he is guilty82 -a statute that permits the defendant to
avoid the risk of execution by pleading guilty is unconstitutionally
coercive.8
One attack on plea bargaining is that the threat is too effec-
tive, that it drives some innocent defendants to plead guilty along
78. SOURCEBOOK 1994, supra note 22, at 480, Table 5.49.
79. E.g., SOURCEBOOK 1994, supra note 22,.at 482, Table 5.28 (dispositions of criminal
cases in U.S. District Courts); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE STATISTICS 1993 Table 5.73 (1993) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK 1993].
80. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L.
REv. 652, 695-703 (1981); Douglas G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The
Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 37, 55 (1983); John H. Langbein,
Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 15-16 (1978); but see Robert E. Scott &
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1919-21 (1992).
81. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978).
82. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970).
83. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968).
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with the mass of guilty ones.8 4 That may happen with some regu-
larity for innocent defendants who are offered light deals: time-
served, diversion, 6-months unsupervised probation, and so forth.
But among the more serious criminal convictions with severe pen-
alties of imprisonment or death-those convictions that show up in
cases of proven miscarriages of justice-the picture is different. I
know of exactly one reported miscarriage of justice based on a
guilty plea for a non-homicidal crime-and that was a peculiar
case, a defendant who pled guilty to a crime he did not commit
along with one which he did commit."5 The available collections of
known errors are hardly representative samples of the universe of
erroneous convictions, and errors based on guilty pleas are proba-
bly less likely to be discovered than those based on trials.88 Even
so, this is a stark contrast to the overwhelming proportion of all
convictions that are based on guilty pleas.
Judging from the available evidence, innocent defendants al-
most never plead guilty when doing so entails a substantial term of
imprisonment. Except in capital prosecutions. Radelet, Bedau and
Putnam 7 list 16 cases of innocent homicide defendants who pled
guilty; in most, fear of execution is given explicitly as the reason
for the plea. This is, no doubt, another illustration of how death is
different. It seems that innocent defendants will almost always risk
additional years of their lives in order to seek vindication rather
than accept disgrace coupled with a long term of imprisonment,
but some will not go so far as to risk death.
The case of John Sosnovske is a good example.8 8 In 1990, he
was falsely implicated in the rape murder of Taunja Bennett by his
girl friend, Laverne Pavlinac, who apparently was afraid of him
and anxious to be rid of him. In the process, Ms. Pavlinac became
entangled in her own lies, and claimed to have participated in the
killing. Both were charged with murder. Ms. Pavlinac recanted her
confession but was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. Fol-
lowing her conviction, Mr. Sosnovske-who was facing the death
penalty-pled no contest and was also sentenced to life imprison-
ment. Both were freed in 1995 after another man, Keith Hunter
Jesperson, confessed and also pled guilty to the same murder. The
Portland Oregonian summed up the case:
84. E.g., Alschuler, supra note 80, at 713-16; Kenneth Kipuis, Criminal Justice and the
Negotiated Plea, 86 ETHics 93 (1976).
85. Gross, supra note 19, at 415 n.62 and accompanying text (the case of James Wilis).
86. Id. at 415.
87. RADELET, BEDAU & PUTNAM, supra note 8.
88. Evidence Clears Them But the Law Does Not, N.Y. Tmis Nov. 2, 1995, at A17.
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But there was, indeed, one lesson in this weird case that does bear remem-
bering. The threat of the death penalty led an innocent man to forgo his
day in court and accept a lesser sentence in exchange for not fighting the
charge. Prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges need to recognize that
risk and ensure the death penalty threat isn't made in a shaky case to exact
a guilty plea.89
2. Failures to Dismiss Charges Against Innocent Defend-
ants. The major filter that may prevent a charge based on ques-
tionable evidence from turning into a conviction is prosecutorial
discretion to dismiss. Overall, dismissals of felony charges outnum-
ber acquittals about 4 to 1.9 Many cases are dismissed because of
weak evidence despite the fact that the prosecutor is convinced
that the defendant is guilty; other cases are dismissed because the
prosecutor is convinced of the defendant's innocence, or has at
least come to doubt his guilt. For homicides, and particularly in
capital cases, both sorts of dismissals are less likely.
A prosecutor might dismiss a weak case (or offer a deal that's
tantamount to dismissal) simply to improve her win/loss ratio at
trial, but the major incentive is to conserve resources. Trials are
time consuming and expensive; they are a scarce resource. Since
most cases cannot be tried, it is obviously sensible to try to restrict
trials to cases where the outcomes will be useful-i.e., convictions.
If possible, likely losses at trial are avoided through plea bargain-
ing; if not, they may be dismissed even if the prosecutor is con-
vinced of the defendant's guilt. Regardless of their belief in the
defendants' guilt, prosecutors focus on the easiest cases-the ones
with the best evidence-since those are the cases where their lim-
ited resources will have the greatest impact. But homicides are dif-
ferent. Homicides (and other notorious crimes) are the cases for
which resources are conserved. A dead loser will still be dismissed,
but what if it's merely likely that the defendant will acquitted? If
it's a robbery, the prosecutor may dump the case and try another;
if it's a murder, she's more likely to forge ahead.
Prosecutors lose a much higher proportion of murder trials
than other felony trials, about 30% vs. about 15%. 91 As Robert
Scott and William Stuntz point out,9 2 the most likely explanation
is that in murder cases they are willing to go to trial with compara-
tively weak evidence. The main effect of this extra effort is that
89. Editorial, Justice Done Finally, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Nov. 28, 1995, at C6.
90. See supra note 79.
91. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTInC, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCFBooK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 1990, at 526, Table 5.51.
92. Robert E. Scott and William J. Stuntz, supra note 80, at 1948-49.
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guilty defendants are convicted who otherwise would never even be
tried. But in some cases the evidence is weak because the defend-
ant is not guilty, and some of those innocent defendants are not
only tried but convicted. In other words (as with police investiga-
tions) as prosecutors work to obtain convictions in hard homicide
cases they draw in cases where it's difficult to separate the inno-
cent from the guilty.
Prosecutors also dismiss charges in some cases because they
believe the defendant may be innocent, regardless of the evidence
that is available to obtain a conviction. The rules of professional
responsibility allow a prosecutor to consider her own view of the
defendant's guilt in deciding whether to charge, but do not require
her to do so." Prosecutors have widely varying views on how to
apply this vague standard, from those who say that they will never
prosecute unless they are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of
the defendant's guilt, to those who believe that regardless of their
own uncertainty, their task is to make a case and let the jury de-
cide. 4 Whatever the prosecutor'sposition in the abstract, an ac-
tual decision to dismiss a serious charge that would probably have
resulted in a conviction is always difficult-especially if the crime
has attracted a lot of attention, or if a victim, or several, were
killed.
On October 8, 1962, John Stinson, a banker in Evansville, In-
diana, was robbed at gunpoint. 5 Six months later, by sheer chance,
Charles Del Monico-a reputed gangster-was identified as the
robber when a witness saw his picture in a newspaper after he had
been indicted for extortion. Eventually six witnesses identified Del
Monico, apparently all in error: he had credible alibi witnesses who
said he was in Miami at the time of the robbery, he passed several
polygraph and "truth serum" tests, and there was no evidence cor-
roborating the eyewitness identifications. On the eve of trial, the
prosecutor, U.S. Attorney Richard Stein dismissed the charges. In
answer to an angry challenge from the victim and his friends, Stein
agreed that Del Monico would probably have been convicted at
trial. Nonetheless, Stein felt compelled to dismiss because he was
persuaded that Del Monico was innocent by the lack of corrobora-
tion of the identifications, and by the mass of inadmissible poly-
graph and truth serum evidence: "We were afraid of a miscarriage
of justice."98 This was a gutsy move. But would Mr. Stein have
93. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, STANDARD 3-
3.9(B), at 71 (3d ed. 1993).
94. Gross, supra note 19, at 445-46.
95. Id. at 438.
96. ROBERT FERGUSON & ALLAN MILLER, THE POLYGRAPH IN COURT 117 (1973).
[Vol. 44490
THE RISKS OF DEATH
done the same if John Stinson had been killed? Or would he have
decided to say: "Let the jury decide"?
The problem is not just public pressure. The evidence of inno-
cence in the Del Monico case did not arrive on the prosecutor's
door step on its own; it was presented by his attorneys. That's the
rule in cases where prosecutors dismiss because they believe the
defendant is innocent. Since everybody agrees that innocent de-
fendants should not be charged, for cases in which the defendant is
innocent there is no conflict between the sides. The trouble is iden-
tifying the cases in which that applies. The defense brings evidence
to the prosecution, often at the cost of some tactical advantage at
trial, in order to persuade the prosecutor that this is one of those
cases. If there happens to be persuasive, independent evidence of
innocence, no problem; but even when there isn't, the defendant
himself does know if he's been wrongly accused. But there's the
rub: as Scott and Stuntz point out, in the absence of persuasive
corroboration, there is no way an innocent defendant can signal his
innocence-not by saying so, not by rejecting plea bargains and
insisting on trial-that a guilty defendant cannot duplicate.97 The
most valuable source of information is also the least credible.
Judge Frank Easterbrook, in a comment on Scott and Stuntz's
article, argues that the prosecutor's difficulty is mitigated by the
role of the defense attorney: "Just as investment bankers may put
their reputations behind hard-to-verify claims of corporate opera-
tions, so lawyers may put their reputations behind proffered infor-
mation ...Prosecutors take seriously information coming from
reputable counsel. Guilty defendants cannot copy the signal of in-
nocence sent by careful honest lawyers."98 There's something to
this-defense attorneys do fill this role-but it's an imperfect sys-
tem at best. It only works if the innocent defendant has a careful,
honest and reputable lawyer-by no means a universal condi-
tion-and if the prosecutor will listen. In many capital cases, the
last condition is undermined by the nature of the pre-trial process.
If the prosecutor insists on the maximum available penalty,
then of course there can be no deal. This is a possible scenario in
any prosecution, but it's rare: there's usually something the state is
willing to give up to get the defendant to plead guilty. In many
death cases, however, the prosecutor knows from the start that she
wants the death penalty. As a result, there is no plea bargaining:
there's nothing to bargain over. In the absence of plea bargaining
there will be fewer open channels of communication between the
97. Robert E. Scott and Wiliam J. Stuntz, supra note 80, at 1951-52, 1967.
98. Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L. J. 1969, 1971
(1992).
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defense and the prosecution, so it may be harder for the defense
attorney to get a serious hearing. Worse, in that context, the true
value of a claim of innocence becomes harder to interpret. When
plea bargaining is an option, a defense lawyer is not likely to com-
mit her credibility to the argument "He didn't do it" unless the
lawyer believes that it's true, since (quite apart from possible ef-
fects on her reputation) taking that position will undermine her
ability to bargain convincingly for a lenient deal. When no deal is
possible, arguing that her client is innocent is the only pre-trial
move left. As far as this client is concerned, there's nothing to lose
by making it. And, since a client's life is at stake, the defense at-
torney may be driven to make the claim whether or not she be-
lieves it. More important, the prosecutor knows that the defense
attorney may feel obliged to argue that the defendant is innocent,
whether or not she thinks it's true. When inflexible lines are drawn
at the start-which is particularly likely in a capital prosecution of
a heinous, gruesome and highly publicized murder-the defense
attorney is less likely to be able to convince the prosecutor of any-
thing, and especially not that her client has been wrongly
accused.9
C. Trial
An innocent defendant who goes to trial faces a high risk of
conviction. The best generalization about juries in criminal cases is
that they usually convict. To be sure, the great majority of defend-
ants should be convicted. The question is: can juries accurately
sort the innocent from the guilty? Or, to put it in context, how
often do juries spot innocent defendants that the prosecutors have
missed? Unfortunately, juries approach this task with two severe
handicaps: they have less information than the prosecutors or the
99. There may also be cases in which a capital defendant insists on his innocence and
refuses a plea bargain that's offered, and the prosecutor reads that refusal as a stronger
signal of possible innocence than a similar move by a non-capital defendant. That could
lead to a further investigation, and perhaps even a dismissal, that would not have occurred
if the charges had been less extreme. This effect (if it occurs) would not "offset" the ten-
dency to take questionable capital cases to trial: it would change the outcomes in a different
subset of capital prosecutions. The net impact (by comparison to non-capital felonies)
would depend on the frequency of errors that are generated on the one hand, and avoided
on the other. See infra note 115 and accompanying text. In this situation, the signal of
innocence-unwillingness to accept a plea-is one that a guilty capital defendant could eas-
ily duplicate, if it was given serious weight by the prosecutor. Scott and Stuntz, supra note
80, at 1967. Therefore, prosecutors are likely to discount its importance, despite the added
risk for a defendant who faces a death sentence at trial. It is also a difficult signal to read,
since the defendant can frequently change his mind and accept the plea bargain until very
late in the process.
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police, and they have essentially no experience. Given these limita-
tions, it is unrealistic to expect juries to systematically correct er-
rors in the earlier decisions to investigate, to arrest and to
prosecute.1 00
This is bad news for homicide defendants. Whether it's be-
cause prosecutors take weaker cases to trial 101 or because they in-
sist on the maximum penalty,102 homicide defendants are more
likely to face a jury than other criminal defendants. In 1992, for
example, 12% of robbery convictions across the country were ob-
tained at trials, of which 8% were jury trials, while 41% of murder
convictions were after trial, including 33% that went to jury
trial.103 In other words, since pre-trial sorting does less to winnow
homicide cases than other prosecutions, homicide defendants are
more likely to face the chancy ordeal of trial.
I do not mean to say that the institution of trial by jury does
not help reduce the incidence of erroneous convictions. It no doubt
does fill that function, but by brute force: by making it more diffi-
cult for the prosecution to obtain any convictions, and by discour-
aging trials of the guilty and the innocent alike unless the evidence
of guilt is very strong. The main benefit of this process is that
feedback from court may improve pre-trial investigations and in-
crease selectivity in charging-the stages of the process we have
already discussed. If all works well, the result is that few innocent
defendants are brought to trial; most defendants who are convicted
are guilty; most who are acquitted are also guilty; and yet, if an
innocent defendant is tried, he will probably be convicted.
Given this structure, trial plays a comparatively minor role in
the production of errors in capital cases. To the extent that jury
behavior at trial does matter, the question is: Do juries behave dif-
ferently in homicide trials in general, and in capital homicides in
particular, than in other criminal trials? There are several reasons
to think that juries treat homicides and capital cases differently
than other criminal cases, and most of them point in the direction
of a higher likelihood of conviction.
100. See Gross, supra note 19, at 432: "If [juries] return few erroneous convictions it is
because they are given few opportunities to judge innocent defendants. In the usual case,
the actual determination of guilt occurs much earlier and in less formal settings, at a police
precinct or in a district attorney's office, and is based on an investigation that is not neces-
sarily conducted in anticipation of a trial." See also id. at 441-49.
101. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
102. Supra note 99 and accompanying text.
103. SouRCaBOOK 1994, supra note 22, at 486, Table. 5.49.
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1. Factors that Increase the Likelihood of Conviction.
a. Publicity. Most crimes, even most homicides, receive very
little attention from the media. A few crimes, however, are heavily
publicized. Many, perhaps most of these notorious crimes are
homicides, and especially the unusual and heinous homicides
which are likely to be charged as capital crimes. In those cases,
most jurors will have heard all sorts of things about the case before
they got to court, many of them inadmissible, misleading and in-
flanmatory. They may have seen or heard or read police officers or
other government officials declare the defendant guilty. They may
have witnessed or felt a general sense of communal outrage. All
this will make them more likely to convict. Courts may attempt to
mitigate the impact of pre-trial publicity by various means-most
effectively by changing the location of the trial-or they refuse to
do so."' As a result, the records of erroneous convictions include
scores of cases in which publicity and public outrage clearly con-
tributed to the error-from the convictions of Leo Frank in 1913105
and the Scottsboro Boys in 1931106, to the conviction of Rolando
Cruz and Alejandro Hernandez in 1985.107
b. Death Qualification. In capital cases, juries decide the
sentence as well as determine guilt or innocence. As a result, thejury selection process includes a unique procedure, "death qualifi-
cation," that is designed to ensure that the jury is qualified for the
sentence phase. Most jurors who are strongly opposed to the death
penalty, and some who are strongly in favor, are excluded at the
outset.108 Many studies have shown that these exclusions make thejury more likely to convict.109 In addition, the process of question-
104. E.g., Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991) (refusal to question jurors about
content of news reports to which they were exposed in heavily publicized trial did not vio-
late defendant's rights to due process and an impartial jury).
105. Bedau and Radelet, supra note 5, at 115.
106. See supra note 46.
107. See supra note 44.
108. The current standards for disqualification are defined by Wainwright v. Witt, 469
U.S. 412 (1985) (limiting the state's power to exclude opponents of the death penalty), and
Morgan v. Illinois, U.S. 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992) (requiring the exclusion of some strong pro-
ponents of capital punishment). See also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); Lock-
hart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
109. E.g., Claudia L. Cowan et al., The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors'Pre-
disposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53 (1984);
Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due Process v. Crime Control: Death Qualifica-
tion and Jury Attitudes, 8 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 31 (1984). See generally Hovey v. Superior
Court, 616 P.2d 1301, 1315-1341 (Cal. 1980) and studies cited therein; see also Grigsby v.
Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983), aff'd 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc),
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ing jurors about their willingness to impose the death penalty
before the defendant has been convicted tends to create the im-
pression that guilt is a foregone conclusion, and the only real issue
is punishment. 1 0
c. Fear of Death. In a capital case, avoiding execution can
become the overriding imperative for the defense. In extreme
cases, fear of death drives innocent defendants to plead guilty in
return for a lesser sentence, even life imprisonment. If the defend-
ant does not plead guilty, either because no plea bargain is offered
or because he was unwilling to take it, the same pressure will be
felt at trial. It may drive the defense to make tactical choices that
compromise its position on guilt in order to improve the odds on
penalty; in some cases, the defense may virtually concede guilt and
focus entirely on punishment. It will certainly distract the defense
from the issue of guilt and force it to spread its resources more
thinly. This distraction might increase the chances of conviction
even for those capital defendants who are represented by skillful
lawyers with adequate resources; it will be far more damaging for
the many capital defendants whose defense is shamefully
inadequate."'
d. Heinousness. In theory, jurors are supposed to separate
their decision on the defendant's guilt from their reaction to the
heinousness of his conduct: If the evidence is insufficient, they
should be just as willing to acquit a serial murderer as a shoplifter.
Nobody believes this. Even in civil trials, where the jury is asked to
decide cases by a preponderance of the evidence, there are indica-
tions that juries (and judges) are more likely to find defendants
liable, on identical evidence, as the harm to the plaintiff in-
creases." '2 In criminal trials the problem is worse, since the burden
of persuasion is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In a close crimi-
nal case the jury is supposed to release a defendant who is in their
opinion, probably guilty. This is a distasteful task under any cir-
rev'd sub nom Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
110. Craig Haney, On The Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of the
Death-Qualification Process, 8 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 121 (1984); Hovey v. Superior Court,
616 P.2d at 1347-54.
111. c.f. Stephen Bright, Counsel For the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994).
112. Edmond S. Howe and Thomas C. Loftus, Integration of Intention and Outcome
Information by Students and Circuit Court Judges: Design Economy and Individual Dif-
ferences, 22 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 102 (1992); Robert MacCoun, The Black Box: What Em-
pirical Research Tells Us About Decision Making by Civil Juries, in VERDICT: ACCESSING
um Crvm JuRY SYSTEM 155-56 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
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cumstances, but it becomes increasingly unpalatable-and un-
likely-as we move up the scale from non-violent crime, to violent
crime, to homicide, to aggravated grisly murder.
2. Factors Which Decrease the Likelihood of Conviction.
a. Quality of Defense. Capital defendants, and to some ex-
tent homicide defendants in general, may be better represented
than other criminal defendants. The attorneys who are appointed
to represent them may be more experienced and skillful, and their
defenders may have more resources at their disposal. Other things
being equal, higher quality representation will decrease the likeli-
hood of conviction, and may operate as a check on errors and mis-
conduct that drive some innocent capital defendants to trial and to
conviction.
b. Severity of the Penalty. Prosecutors, defense attorneys,
and judges widely believe that some jurors are more reluctant to
convict a defendant who might be executed than one who faces a
less extreme punishment. In Adams v. Texas11 s the United States
Supreme Court acknowledges this possibility and held that a juror
could not automatically be excluded from service because of this
reaction:
Nor in our view would the Constitution permit the exclusion of jurors from
the penalty phase of a Texas murder trial if they... frankly concede that
the prospects of death penalty may affect what their honest judgment of the
facts will be or what they deem to be a reasonable doubt. Such assessments
and judgments are inherent in the jury system .... 114
To the extent that jurors do feel this way, they may be less likely
to convict in capital trials than in other homicides.
3. Net Effects. When there are forces that push in one direc-
tion and forces that push in the other, it is sometimes possible to
say that they cancel out. Not here. A sailboat that keeps getting
hit by gusts from the east is no less likely to capsize if there are
also gusts from the west.
The effects I have described are extremely variable. Publicity,
death-qualification, the heinousness of a homicide-each of these
may make a critical difference in a particular case, or it may not.
On the other side, the protective features of capital trials are une-
113. 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
114. Id. at 50.
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ven at best. Many capital defendants do not have quality represen-
tation, by any standard.115 And the anxiety that jurors may feel
when a defendant's life is at stake will be relieved if a jury decides
(as they often do in deliberations on guilt) that he will not be sen-
tenced to death. If they do get that far, the competing impulse-to
not free a man who has killed-may take over, in force.
I once saw a cartoon of two men in black robes, obviously
judges, talking in a hall. One says: "Some days I'm feeling good
and everyone gets probation, and some days I get up on the wrong
side of bed and I throw the book at everybody. It all balances out."
In statistical terms, the problem is increased variance: Since no-
body gets the average punishment, the more the judge's sentences
are spread out arbitrarily, the more of them are errors-and errors
on one side don't balance out errors on the other. In capital trials,
one particular type of error-an uncommon one-is overwhelm-
ingly important: conviction of an innocent defendant. Given the
nature of the problem, I hazard to add one more metaphor: If
you're building a seawall, adding height to one part won't counter-
act cutting away at another.
IV. CONCLUSION: CATCHING ERRORS
The basic conclusion is simple. The steady stream of errors
that we see in cases in which defendants are sentenced to death is
a predictable consequence of our system of investigating and pros-
ecuting capital murder. And behind those cases, there is no doubt
a much larger group of erroneous convictions in cases in which de-
fendants are not sentenced to death. But what about what happens
after trial? Everybody knows that direct and collateral review are
more painstaking for capital cases than for any others. Isn't it
likely that all these mistakes are caught and corrected somewhere
in that exacting process? The answer, I'm afraid, is No. At best, we
could do an imperfect job of catching errors after they occur, and
in many cases we don't really try. As a result, most miscarriages of
justice in capital cases never come to light.
Judging from the errors that are discovered, three factors are
usually responsible for a defendant's exoneration, separately or in
combination: Attention, Confession, and Luck.
1. Attention. If a defendant is sentenced to death, he may
well get more careful and attentive consideration from the courts
on review. More important, he is likely to be better represented on
direct appeal than he would be otherwise, and he is likely to have
115. See Stephen Bright, supra note 109.
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counsel on the post-appellate collateral review, while most defend-
ants have none. These advantages may help explain the high pro-
portion of death sentences among all miscarriages of justice.11 But
there is another side to this coin. Many capital defendant who are
convicted in error are not sentenced to death, very likely most.
They do not receive any special attention from their attorneys or
from the courts; on the contrary, they might suffer from the per-
ception that they've already received the benefit of whatever
doubts their cases may raise. When Walter McMillian was released
after six years on death row for a murder for which he had been
framed, 17 his attorney said that "only the death sentence had al-
lowed Mr. McMillian to receive adequate representation,"11 8 which
eventually uncovered the plot against him. If McMillian had
merely been sentenced to life imprisonment, most likely he would
never have been heard from again.
2. Confession. In most cases in which miscarriages of justice
are uncovered, the real criminal confesses to the crime.119 In the
common scenario, the true murderer is arrested and imprisoned for
another crime-sometimes a similar homicide-and confesses
while in prison. For example, Melvin Reynolds confessed falsely,
under intense pressure, to the rape-murder of a 4-year-old boy; he
was released when the real criminal was arrested and confessed to
three murders, including the one for which Reynolds was impris-
oned.1 20 Similarly, Rolando Cruz and Alejandro Hernandez,121 each
of whom had been convicted twice for the killing of Jeanine Nicar-
ico, were freed ten years after another man-convicted child-killer
Brian Dugan-confessed that he had committed the murder
alone.1
22
3. Luck. Getting a confession from the real killer is the com-
mon stroke of luck in cases in which a miscarriage of justice is
caught. But sometimes luck takes a different route. The break in
116. See supra text accompanying note 25.
117. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
118. Applebome, supra note 45, at Bl.
119. Gross, supra note 19, at 421; Arye Rattner, supra note 19, at 292. Rattner states
that in 40.5% of his wrongful convictions exoneration was caused by a confession of the real
culprit. This appears to be an underestimate, since he lists various forms of official exonera-
tion-pardon, habeas corpus, etc.-as separate causes, when they are often triggered by
such confessions.
120. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
122. Allan H. Gray & Courtney Edelhart, Judge Rules Cruz Innocent Finally, The
Whole Case Just Fell Apart, Cm. Tam., Nov. 4, 1995.
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Randall Dale Adams' case 12 came when documentary film maker
Errol Morris ran into Adams by chance in 1985 when Morris was
doing research on psychiatric testimony in Texas capital prosecu-
tions. Morris went on to produce a movie about Adams' case, The
Thin Blue Line, which was released in 1988; the movie drew na-
tional attention to the case and resulted in Adams' release in 1989,
twelve years after he had been sentenced to death.124
Paris Carriger's case'2 5 illustrates how all three factors can in-
fluence a single case. Although his representation at trial was
shamefully inadequate, since his death sentenced Carriger has
been represented by increasingly skillful attorneys, on appeal and
in state and federal habeas corpus proceedings. 12 These lawyers
have been able to bring the deep problems in his case to the atten-
tion of the courts, although so far, without ultimate success. The
relative prominence of the case also produced a lucky break. When
Carriger appeared in a TV documentary about Arizona's death
row, one of the hundreds of thousands of viewers recognized the
case: he had heard the state's chief witness, Robert Dunbar, brag
that he had done the killing and framed someone else for it. The
viewer called Carriger's lawyers, who used that evidence in a state
court hearing challenging the conviction. In the course of that
hearing, Dunbar-who by then was in prison for other
crimes-appeared in court and confessed that he was the killer,
and that he had lied at Carriger's trial. Three weeks later, Dunbar
retracted his confession, and the case settled into a long-term
muddle: hearings, appeals, execution dates, stays, hearings, execu-
tion dates, stays. At this writing, the case is pending before the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals; the issue, apparently, is whether it
is necessary to determine whether evidence of Dunbar's confession
would have influenced the trial judge's decision on penalty.12 7
Carriger may yet be executed, despite grave doubts about his
guilt. On the other hand, his death sentence may be vacated, in
which case, I expect, the courts will be content to let it rest at that.
That he was convicted by an admitted perjurer and that he may
well be entirely innocent, these facts will carry little weight if all he
faces is life imprisonment.
The basic cause for the comparatively large number of errors
123. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
124. Kennedy & Cerone, supra note 62.
125. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
126. Beth Hawkins and Kristin Solheim, supra note 69; see Carriger v. Lewis, No. Civ-
95-1617-PHX-PGR, Mem. Decision and Order (D. Ariz. Nov. 1, 1995) (summarizing proce-
dural history of case).
127. Telephone interview with Denise Young, attorney, Paris Carriger, Dec. 4, 1995.
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in capital cases is a natural and laudable human impulse: We want
murderers to be caught and punished. In some cases that impulse
drives police and prosecutors to lie and cheat, but more often it
simply motivates them to work harder to catch killers and to con-
vict them. It works: More cases are cleared, more murderers are
convicted. But harder cases are more likely to produce errors-still
exceptions, no doubt, but not as rare as for other crimes, where the
cases that are prosecuted are mostly skimmed off the top. If there
were some general method for identifying the errors, we wouldn't
have this problem in the first place. But of course, there isn't. In-
stead, the errors that we do discover advertise the existence of
others that we don't. What are the odds that an innocent prisoner
will run into a movie producer who is struck by his story? What if
the real killer is killed in a car crash, or dies from a drug overdose,
or is never arrested, or never confesses?
Attention and quality representation do improve an innocent
defendant's chances. They help get hearings in court, they increase
visibility which produces opportunities for lucky breaks, they buy
time during which the true killer may confess. But these assets
(whatever their value) are unevenly distributed. For the most part,
they are the special preserve of defendants who have been sen-
tenced to death and who still face the possibility of execution. And
even for that restricted group this special attention is under fire.
Resources for post conviction defense have been cut back, the ba-
ses for review in federal court have been limited, and the process
of review has been accelerated. 128 Perhaps these changes will have
little effect in practice. But if they do, one likely consequence is
that fewer mistakes will be caught, even among those cases that
remain on the track to execution, and that more defendants will be
killed by the state in error.
128. The most important recent development in this area was the passage in April,
1996, of the "Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996" (Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214), which included substantial amendments to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253, 2254,
2255, and to related statutory provisions, that greatly limit the availability of federal habeas
corpus as an avenue of review in capital cases.
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